Incident Response Playbooks
SOC 2 Control: CC7.2
This document provides step-by-step playbooks for responding to common security incidents.
Playbook Index
| ID | Playbook | Trigger |
|---|---|---|
| PB-001 | Data Breach Response | Confirmed data exposure |
| PB-002 | Account Compromise | Unauthorized access detected |
| PB-003 | Ransomware Attack | Encryption detected |
| PB-004 | DDoS Attack | Service degradation |
| PB-005 | API Key Exposure | Key found in public repo |
| PB-006 | Phishing Attack | Successful phishing |
| PB-007 | Insider Threat | Suspicious employee activity |
| PB-008 | Third-Party Breach | Vendor reports breach |
PB-001: Data Breach Response
Severity: Critical (P1)
Trigger Conditions
- Customer data exposed externally
- PII or credentials leaked
- Database dump discovered
Immediate Actions (0-15 minutes)
[ ] 1. DECLARE INCIDENT
- Page incident commander
- Create incident channel: #inc-YYYYMMDD-breach
- Start incident log
[ ] 2. ASSESS SCOPE
- What data was exposed?
- How many users affected?
- Is exposure ongoing?
[ ] 3. CONTAIN
- Revoke compromised credentials
- Block unauthorized access paths
- Isolate affected systems if needed
Short-Term Actions (15 min - 4 hours)
[ ] 4. EVIDENCE PRESERVATION
- Snapshot affected systems
- Export relevant logs
- Document timeline
[ ] 5. IMPACT ANALYSIS
- Identify all affected records
- Classify data types exposed
- Determine exposure duration
[ ] 6. STAKEHOLDER NOTIFICATION
- Legal team (within 1 hour)
- Executive team (within 2 hours)
- Prepare customer notification draft
Recovery Actions (4-72 hours)
[ ] 7. REMEDIATION
- Fix vulnerability that caused breach
- Reset affected credentials
- Implement additional controls
[ ] 8. CUSTOMER NOTIFICATION
- Send within 72 hours (GDPR requirement)
- Include: what happened, what data, what we're doing
- Provide support contact
[ ] 9. REGULATORY NOTIFICATION
- GDPR: 72 hours to supervisory authority
- Other regulations as applicable
Post-Incident
[ ] 10. POST-INCIDENT REVIEW (within 5 days)
- Root cause analysis
- Timeline documentation
- Lessons learned
- Control improvements
[ ] 11. DOCUMENTATION
- Complete incident report
- Update risk register
- File audit evidence
Contacts
| Role | Contact | Responsibility |
|---|---|---|
| Incident Commander | On-call rotation | Overall coordination |
| Legal | [email protected] | Regulatory compliance |
| Comms | [email protected] | Customer notification |
| Executive | CEO direct line | Business decisions |
PB-002: Account Compromise
Severity: High (P2)
Trigger Conditions
- Impossible travel detected
- Login from unknown device/location
- User reports unauthorized activity
- Credential stuffing detected
Immediate Actions (0-15 minutes)
[ ] 1. CONTAIN
- Suspend affected account
- Terminate all active sessions
- Block source IP if known
[ ] 2. ASSESS
- What actions were taken?
- What data was accessed?
- Are other accounts affected?
[ ] 3. NOTIFY USER
- If legitimate user: require password reset + MFA
- If attacker: preserve evidence
Investigation (15 min - 2 hours)
[ ] 4. AUDIT TRAIL REVIEW
- Last 7 days of activity
- Data access patterns
- Configuration changes
[ ] 5. LATERAL MOVEMENT CHECK
- Related accounts
- Shared resources
- API key usage
[ ] 6. CREDENTIAL ANALYSIS
- Was password reused?
- Is password in known breaches?
- MFA status at time of compromise
Recovery (2-24 hours)
[ ] 7. CREDENTIAL RESET
- Force password change
- Rotate API keys
- Revoke OAuth tokens
[ ] 8. ACCESS RESTORATION
- Verify user identity
- Enable MFA if not active
- Restore appropriate access
[ ] 9. MONITORING
- Enhanced logging for 30 days
- Alert on suspicious patterns
Root Cause Checklist
- Phishing attack?
- Credential reuse from other breach?
- Weak password?
- Malware on user device?
- Session hijacking?
- MFA bypass?
PB-003: Ransomware Attack
Severity: Critical (P1)
Trigger Conditions
- Files being encrypted
- Ransom note displayed
- Systems becoming unresponsive
Immediate Actions (0-5 minutes)
!!! DO NOT PAY RANSOM WITHOUT EXECUTIVE/LEGAL APPROVAL !!!
[ ] 1. ISOLATE
- Disconnect affected systems from network
- Do NOT power off (preserve memory)
- Block lateral movement paths
[ ] 2. PAGE
- All incident responders
- Executive team
- Legal counsel
[ ] 3. ASSESS SPREAD
- What systems are affected?
- Is encryption still spreading?
- Are backups safe?
Containment (5-60 minutes)
[ ] 4. NETWORK ISOLATION
- Segment infected zone
- Block C2 communications
- Preserve network logs
[ ] 5. BACKUP VERIFICATION
- Check backup integrity
- Verify backups not compromised
- Isolate backup systems
[ ] 6. EVIDENCE COLLECTION
- Memory dump if possible
- Ransom note copy
- Network traffic capture
Recovery Path Decision
DECISION TREE:
1. Are clean backups available?
YES → Proceed to backup restoration
NO → Evaluate decryption options
2. Is decryptor available?
Check: nomoreransom.org
YES → Test on non-critical system first
NO → Evaluate ransom payment (last resort)
3. Ransom payment consideration:
- Legal review required
- Executive approval required
- No guarantee of decryption
- May fund criminal activity
Recovery (hours to days)
[ ] 7. CLEAN RESTORATION
- Build systems from clean images
- Restore data from verified backups
- Do NOT reconnect to network until verified clean
[ ] 8. SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS
- Patch vulnerability used for entry
- Implement additional endpoint protection
- Review and improve backup strategy
[ ] 9. BUSINESS CONTINUITY
- Prioritize critical systems
- Communicate status to stakeholders
- Document downtime impact
PB-004: DDoS Attack
Severity: High (P2)
Trigger Conditions
- Sudden traffic spike
- Service degradation
- Upstream provider notification
Immediate Actions (0-5 minutes)
[ ] 1. CONFIRM ATTACK
- Check traffic patterns
- Verify not legitimate spike
- Identify attack type (volumetric, protocol, app layer)
[ ] 2. ENGAGE MITIGATION
- Enable DDoS protection (Cloudflare/AWS Shield)
- Rate limit aggressive IPs
- Scale infrastructure if possible
[ ] 3. COMMUNICATE
- Update status page
- Notify support team
- Alert affected customers
Mitigation (5-60 minutes)
[ ] 4. TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
- Identify attack signatures
- Determine source (botnet, amplification)
- Block malicious patterns
[ ] 5. FILTER RULES
- Geographic filtering if applicable
- Rate limiting
- Challenge suspicious traffic
[ ] 6. UPSTREAM COORDINATION
- Contact ISP if needed
- Engage CDN support
- Consider null routing as last resort
Recovery
[ ] 7. VERIFY NORMAL OPERATION
- Monitor traffic patterns
- Check all endpoints
- Verify no data exfiltration (DDoS as distraction)
[ ] 8. STRENGTHEN DEFENSES
- Review DDoS protection config
- Update rate limits
- Improve traffic analysis
PB-005: API Key Exposure
Severity: High (P2)
Trigger Conditions
- Key found in public GitHub repo
- Key detected by scanning service
- Key reported by security researcher
Immediate Actions (0-5 minutes)
[ ] 1. ROTATE KEY IMMEDIATELY
- Do not wait for investigation
- Generate new key
- Update deployed services
[ ] 2. REVOKE OLD KEY
- Mark as compromised
- Log revocation time
[ ] 3. ASSESS EXPOSURE
- When was key exposed?
- What access did it provide?
- Was it used maliciously?
Investigation (5-60 minutes)
[ ] 4. AUDIT KEY USAGE
- Review all API calls with this key
- Identify suspicious activity
- Check for data exfiltration
[ ] 5. SOURCE IDENTIFICATION
- How did key get exposed?
- Developer mistake?
- Build system leak?
- Third-party compromise?
[ ] 6. IMPACT ASSESSMENT
- What resources were accessible?
- Was any action taken?
- Customer data affected?
Remediation
[ ] 7. FIX EXPOSURE SOURCE
- Remove from repository history (BFG Repo-Cleaner)
- Update .gitignore
- Add pre-commit hooks
[ ] 8. PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS
- Secret scanning in CI/CD
- Developer training
- Secret management review
Prevention Checklist
- Pre-commit hooks for secret detection
- CI/CD secret scanning
- Regular key rotation policy
- Minimal-privilege key scopes
- Secret management tooling
PB-006: Phishing Attack
Severity: Medium-High (P2/P3)
Trigger Conditions
- Employee clicked phishing link
- Credentials entered on fake site
- Malicious attachment opened
Immediate Actions (0-15 minutes)
[ ] 1. CREDENTIAL RESET
- Force password change immediately
- Revoke all sessions
- Enable/verify MFA
[ ] 2. DEVICE CHECK
- Scan for malware
- Check for unusual processes
- Review browser history
[ ] 3. ASSESS SCOPE
- What credentials were entered?
- What access does this user have?
- Were others targeted?
Investigation
[ ] 4. PHISHING ANALYSIS
- Capture phishing page (screenshot, source)
- Identify indicators of compromise
- Report to phishing databases
[ ] 5. RELATED ACTIVITY CHECK
- Search logs for phishing domain
- Check if others visited
- Look for lateral movement
[ ] 6. CREDENTIAL ABUSE CHECK
- Monitor for suspicious logins
- Check OAuth authorizations
- Review API key usage
Remediation
[ ] 7. BLOCK INDICATORS
- Block phishing domain
- Block sender email
- Update email filters
[ ] 8. USER SUPPORT
- Additional training
- No-blame discussion
- Credit monitoring if PII exposed
[ ] 9. ORGANIZATION-WIDE
- Send awareness reminder
- Consider targeted training
- Update phishing simulations
PB-007: Insider Threat
Severity: High (P2)
Trigger Conditions
- Unusual data access patterns
- Mass data download
- Unauthorized configuration changes
- Tip from colleague
Immediate Actions (0-15 minutes)
!!! HANDLE WITH EXTREME CONFIDENTIALITY !!!
[ ] 1. ASSESS THREAT LEVEL
- Immediate risk to systems?
- Data exfiltration in progress?
- Is person on premises?
[ ] 2. LIMITED NOTIFICATION
- Legal counsel
- HR representative
- Executive sponsor
- DO NOT alert subject
[ ] 3. EVIDENCE PRESERVATION
- Export audit logs
- Document observed behavior
- Preserve chain of custody
Investigation
[ ] 4. ACTIVITY AUDIT
- Access logs (last 90 days)
- Data downloads
- External transfers
- Off-hours activity
[ ] 5. DEVICE ANALYSIS
- With HR/Legal approval
- USB device usage
- Cloud sync activity
- Email attachments
[ ] 6. MOTIVATION ASSESSMENT
- Financial stress?
- Notice given?
- Grievances?
- External pressure?
Response Options
DECISION MATRIX:
If immediate threat:
→ Disable access, involve security
If investigation needed:
→ Enhanced monitoring, document evidence
If departure imminent:
→ Accelerate exit, secure access
If criminal activity:
→ Engage law enforcement, preserve evidence
Important Notes
- Involve HR and Legal from the start
- Document everything
- Maintain confidentiality
- Avoid tipping off subject
- Consider defamation risks
PB-008: Third-Party Breach
Severity: Varies (P2-P3)
Trigger Conditions
- Vendor notifies of breach
- Public disclosure
- Shared credentials compromised
Immediate Actions (0-30 minutes)
[ ] 1. ASSESS RELATIONSHIP
- What data do they have?
- What access do they have?
- What systems are integrated?
[ ] 2. ROTATE CREDENTIALS
- API keys
- OAuth tokens
- Shared accounts
[ ] 3. REVIEW ACCESS LOGS
- Vendor's access patterns
- Any unusual activity?
- Timeline overlap with breach
Investigation
[ ] 4. VENDOR COMMUNICATION
- Request incident report
- Understand scope of breach
- Get timeline of events
[ ] 5. DATA IMPACT ANALYSIS
- What Aragora data was exposed?
- Customer data affected?
- System access compromised?
[ ] 6. DOWNSTREAM IMPACT
- Were our customers affected?
- Do we need to notify anyone?
- Regulatory obligations?
Response
[ ] 7. CONTAINMENT
- Disable vendor access if necessary
- Implement compensating controls
- Monitor for anomalies
[ ] 8. VENDOR MANAGEMENT
- Document incident
- Update risk assessment
- Review contract terms
- Consider relationship continuation
[ ] 9. COMMUNICATION
- Internal stakeholders
- Affected customers (if needed)
- Regulators (if required)
General Incident Documentation Template
# Incident Report: [INCIDENT-ID]
## Summary
- **Date/Time Detected:**
- **Date/Time Contained:**
- **Date/Time Resolved:**
- **Severity:**
- **Incident Commander:**
## Timeline
| Time | Event | Actor |
|------|-------|-------|
| | | |
## Impact
- Users affected:
- Data exposed:
- Services impacted:
- Duration:
## Root Cause
[Description of root cause]
## Actions Taken
1.
2.
3.
## Lessons Learned
- What worked well:
- What could be improved:
## Follow-up Items
- [ ] Action item 1 (Owner, Due date)
- [ ] Action item 2 (Owner, Due date)
## Appendices
- Logs
- Screenshots
- Communications
Last updated: January 2026 Document owner: Security Team Review cycle: Semi-annual